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Barbara Montero considers whether or not we are able to remember what pain feels like. In 
order to properly answer this question, she introduces a new type of memory called 
“qualitative memory”, which seems common to exteroceptive sensations. Having concluded 
that there is arguably no qualitative memory for pain and other bodily sensations, Montero 
considers possible philosophical implications for areas including rational choice-making and 
empathy. In addressing the relationship between pain and memory, the paper raises an issue 
that has not received much attention and indicates various interesting fields of research for 
which the apparent inability to remember pain might prove relevant. My comment primarily 
focuses on the core concepts of pain and qualitative memory which are foundational for the 
paper.  I argue that a deeper engagement with some key aspects of these concepts is 
necessary. A more fine-grained discussion could have made Montero’s argument more 
convincing. 
To begin, understanding pain, one of the core concepts of the paper, is of utmost importance. 
Montero understands pain in terms of a particular phenomenal character: the qualitative feel 
of what it is like to experience pain. This phenomenal character is supposed to be non-
identical to any of the qualities introduced by Melzack & Casey (1968) and prominently 
tested by the McGill Pain Questionnaire (Melzack, 2005). Accordingly, pain cannot be 
identified with any sensory, affective, or evaluative quality. Referencing Davis, Kucyi, & 
Moayedi (2015), Montero identifies pain with a more fundamental “ouch”. 
 A general issue for pain researchers across disciplines is the notorious ambiguity of 
the English term “pain” (e.g. Borg et al., 2020; Wierzbicka, 2012). The concept of pain as 
introduced by the neuroscientists Davis, Kucyi, & Moayedi is innovative, but not commonly 
applied in the literature. Without further elaboration, it remains vague. This is especially true 
in its relation to other concepts that are in the focus of the philosophical debate. On one hand, 
the term “pain” can denote the opposite of pleasure, commonly referred to as unpleasantness, 
painfulness, badness, or suffering (e.g. Bain, 2017; Klein, 2015b). On the other hand, the term 
“pain” can denote the unique phenomenal character associated with bodily pains, such as 
labor pain, muscle pain, headache, and the like. These two concepts of pain are not identical 
(e.g. Bain & Brady, 2014; Fink, 2011; Grahek, 2007). For one thing, various mental 
phenomena other than bodily pains fall into the category of unpleasant sensations. We might, 
for example, think of the painfulness of starving, the badness of a panic attack, or the 
suffering of a grieving child. Moreover, the pains of pain asymbolia patients are often 
characterized as cases of bodily pain experienced without unpleasantness or badness (e.g. 
Bain, 2013; Klein, 2015a). 
Both concepts play an implicit role throughout the paper. Montero focuses on 
examples of bodily pains and distinguishes them from so-called social pains (e.g. loneliness or 
grief) as well as other bodily sensations from which a person might suffer (e.g. hunger or 
cold). The expression “ouch,” and further considerations on empathy, highlight the 
unpleasantness of such bodily pains. Adding to the confusion, the unpleasantness of pain is 
often considered identical to the affective quality that Melzack & Casey introduce (e.g. Corns, 
2014) and that Montero explicitly excludes. Further elaboration of the presupposed notion of 
pain would enable Montero’s account to be more fully embedded into the recent philosophical 
debate. Such elaboration would not only be of conceptual value, but might provide a starting 
point for memory research by allowing investigators to explain precisely what they are testing 
for to their participants. 
In addition, it should be noted that the term “qualitative” is ambiguous. This ambiguity 
can lead to misunderstandings, especially in empirical research on pain memory. For example, 
in Terry & Gijsbers (2000)’s investigation of the consistency of reports of labor pain over 
time, their most interesting finding concerns the differences between quantitative and 
qualitative aspects. Subjective reports concerning quantitative aspects, i.e. intensity, were 
relatively consistent over time whereas the qualitative descriptors varied substantially. 
Montero interprets this as suggesting an inability to remember the fundamental qualitative 
feel of pain. However, it is important to note that the qualitative aspects in the study 
corresponded to the adjectives of the sensory, affective, and evaluative categories presented in 
the McGill Pain Questionnaire. Thus, the qualitative aspects examined in the study are not 
necessarily the fundamental qualitative feel that Montero presupposes.  
It would be interesting to consider how the fundamental “ouch” of pain that Montero 
aims to investigate relates to the sensory, affective, and evaluative dimensions introduced by 
Melzack & Casey (1968), especially as their work still influences and guides recent research. 
This issue seems especially relevant for understanding how scientists might ultimately test for 
the memory of pain in accordance with Montero’s conceptualization of this research subject. 
I now turn to the second core concept of the paper: qualitative memory. In the first section, 
Montero reviews recent empirical literature on pain memory and amnesia. Her main 
conclusion is that the available data is ambiguous. This ambiguity is due to confusion over 
whether subjects report to know that they were feeling pain or to remember what it was like to 
feel pain. What is relevant for Montero is the ability of subjects to remember the phenomenal 
character of an experience and not their ability to know that they underwent an experience. 
The latter might entirely rely on semantic memory. In the second section, Montero argues for 
the introduction of the new concept of qualitative memory. Qualitative memory enables a 
subject to recall the feeling of what it is like to undergo an experience. Qualitative memory is 
not merely distinct from semantic memory, but also from episodic memory. The introduction 
of this new type of memory, especially as distinct from episodic memory, seems motivated by 
two main arguments which I will discuss at length.  
First, qualitative memory is supposed to add something to episodic memory. Episodic 
memory is commonly considered to underlie the ability to reconstruct personally experienced 
past events and as similar to mental time travel (Tulving, 1985). Unlike semantic knowledge 
of event-related information, episodic memory operates when the subject is in a different 
phenomenological state, re-experiencing a past event from a particular perspective, including 
modality-specific sensory information (e.g. Mahr & Csibra, 2018). Episodic memory allows 
us to remember where we were at a certain time, what we have been doing, with whom we 
have been, and how we felt (e.g. Wheeler & Ploran, 2009). Now, imagine the following 
situation: after an accident, a man remembers that he lost control over his car in the morning 
near his house. He can remember seeing the frost glittering on the street, feeling the car 
sliding, and finally hearing his elbow bone breaking. He has episodic memory of various 
aspects of the event while being able to vividly re-experience corresponding sensations. By 
contrast, he cannot retrospectively conjure the feeling of what it was like to be in pain, though 
he might know that he was feeling an intense aching pain in his arm. According to Montero, 
subjects in such situations have semantic and episodic memory of pain. In order to account for 
the remaining “qualitative” gap, i.e. the subject’s inability to re-experience the pain itself, 
another type of memory is introduced and said to be absent in these cases. 
The plausibility of this argument depends on whether the subject in the described 
example has episodic memory of pain, as Montero states. Without doubt, the subject has 
episodic memory of some aspects of the accident related to pain. But is this sufficient to claim 
that the subject has episodic memory of the pain itself? For example, one could argue that the 
man’s memory has episodic gaps because he cannot remember every aspect of the past 
episode: he cannot remember how it felt to be in pain. If so, what is missing is episodic 
memory of pain and, in accordance with Terry et al. (2008), the interesting task for future 
research is to investigate whether subjects always lack such episodic memory. Information 
from different sense modalities might be stored and retrieved in different manners and in 
some cases we might only possess episodic memory related to some of them. This is an 
interesting observation on its own, but does not necessarily require the introduction of a new 
type of memory.1  
Second, qualitative memory is supposed to be decoupled from the memory of a 
particular past event. That is, qualitative memory is not related to the accurate or inaccurate 
recall of a fact or a past event but to the more general conjuration of a particular feeling. 
Montero posits that we arguably possess qualitative memory of this kind for exteroceptive 
sense modalities. For example, one could remember what it is like to see something red 
without remembering a particular event in which one saw something red. By contrast, such 
memory is apparently non-existent for bodily sensations, such as pain. Hence, in order to 
account for this difference, we need to introduce qualitative memory present in the former but 
not in the latter.  
In order to better understand the conjuring of a qualitative feel, and to exclude the 
possibility of alternative explanations, it will be helpful to further elaborate the relation 
between episodic memory and other cognitive capacities with which it shares features, such as 
imagination or dreaming (e.g. Mahr & Csibra, 2018). For example, one might argue that in 
“decoupled” memories of phenomenal experiences we access and flexibly compound 
information concerning experiential properties stored in episodic memory when imagining or 
dreaming what it is like to see a red object.2 This ability requires previous encounters with red 
objects, but does not necessarily require capacities other than episodic memory and 
imagination or dreaming. The relationship between such related cognitive acts is quite 
complex and its full-blown discussion would exceed the scope of this comment. However, the 
                                                          
1 Note that my aim is not to show that the considered cases can be explained in terms of gaps in episodic 
memory. However, a more fine-grained discussion of what it means to possess episodic memory of a past event, 
and of the corresponding phenomenal aspects of different sense modalities, could have made Montero’s 
argument more convincing. 
2 For a similar argument concerning empathic imagination see Boisserie-Lacroix & Inchingolo (2019). 
above considerations are sufficient to suggest that episodic memory might do more work than 
Montero assumes. 
In sum, Montero points to an aspect of memory that is rarely the focus of debate, 
namely the ability to conjure the feeling of what it is like to undergo a certain experience. 
Introducing a new concept can be a useful tool to indicate such neglect. However, the 
argument in favor of a new type of memory would be stronger if the possibility of accounting 
for the phenomenon in terms of commonly accepted cognitive capacities were considered in 
more detail. This is especially true as experiential features of different sensations occur at 
least in the periphery of the philosophical and empirical literature. So far, a definite criterion 
to identify the presence or absence of qualitative memory is missing, particularly in contrast 
to episodic memory. 
As one of the main claims of the paper, Montero argues for a substantial difference between 
exteroceptive and various interoceptive sense modalities in our ability to remember their 
qualitative feel. Arguably, we are able to remember what it is like to see something red, to 
hear a certain melody, to taste certain food, or to smell a certain odor, either in direct 
connection to a particular past event or decoupled from such. This appears false with respect 
to other bodily sensations, especially pain, hunger, or thermal sensations.  
In arguing for this claim, Montero primarily relies on first-person experience. Though 
this constitutes a valid starting point, it may be that others do not share the same intuitions. 
For example, I am not able to actively conjure the feeling of what it is like to smell fish or to 
taste cheesecake without a strong and directly related external trigger. Even if I make an effort 
to remember a specific past event, I can hardly bring about the phenomenal character of 
olfactory or gustatory sensations. By contrast, just imagining itch is sufficient to generate a 
corresponding feeling (see FN3) and dreaming of waves of snow crashing over me provides at 
least a glimpse of the stinging unpleasant feeling of cold. Pain seems to be one of the 
sensations that is particularly hard to conjure. However, at least some studies indicate that 
vivid recall of pain is possible, for example, when showing women videotapes of their own 
labor (see Niven & Murphy-Black, 2000; FN 10). Moreover, it is in principle imaginable that 
patients who have suffered from chronic pain for years can vividly re-experience the feeling 
of what it is like to be in pain even after successful treatment. 
There may be no dichotomy between those sensations whose phenomenal character 
we can remember and those which we cannot. There might rather exist gradual differences, 
i.e. degrees of ease or difficulty with which we can conjure the feeling of certain sensations. 
Such a picture might be less attractive because it is less radical. However, it allows us to 
account for gradual differences across sensations (e.g. vision vs. cold vs. pain) and their 
subtypes (e.g. fracture pain vs. menstrual pain vs. labor pain) as well as for differences 
concerning the salience or strength of triggers needed to elicit the respective qualitative feel 
(e.g. conjuring the feeling of pain when thinking about pain vs. seeing a muted tape of a pain-
related event vs. adding sound). Moreover, we could account for inter-individual differences 
and the influence of past experiences (e.g. healthy subjects vs. chronic pain patients). 
Apparent contradictions among empirical studies concerning the vivid memory of pain (e.g. 
Morley (1993) vs. Niven & Murphy-Black (2000)) might not then rely on confusions of 
different types of memory. They might instead be explained by their varying experimental 
settings. Systematically embedding the discussion of pain memory or amnesia into the 
available research data is thus of very high importance. 
As a final note, I would like to comment on two minor issues. First, Montero claims that pain 
experiences are poor teachers because we are unable to actively conjure them. If we cannot 
remember or imagine pain, then we cannot learn what it is like to have pain. One of the most 
important things that pains teach us is thus neglected. Pain constitutes a basic mechanism for 
protecting our physical well-being by guiding our behavior, short-term and long-term. A child 
that feels pain in the hand when touching a hot plate will immediately withdraw the hand and 
learn not to repeat such actions in the future. For example, seeing or imagining that one’s own 
hand approaches a hot plate might not conjure the qualitative feel of pain. However, it brings 
the intrinsic strong motivation to not perform such action which seems to be of significant 
biological value. 
Second, Montero addresses the issue of empathy, assuming that we are unable to 
experience the fundamental qualitative feel of another person’s pain. At least some studies 
indicate that we are able to experience the affective quality of another person’s pain, i.e. its 
unpleasantness (e.g. Singer et al., 2004). If the fundamental “ouch” of pain is considered 
identical to this unpleasantness or badness, then these studies suggest that we can feel what it 
is like for others to experience pain. If not, they still suggest that we can feel a glimpse of the 
unpleasantness of another person’s pain. It may be that we cannot actively conjure the feeling 
of pain, but we can suffer along with our past selves or others in the light of sufficient external 
triggers. A more detailed consideration of the concepts of pain and empathy in the light of this 
recent empirical research would be needed to draw more definite conclusions. 
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